Crisis intervention units and third party intermediaries by Walden, Steven W.
 
 
The Bill Blackwood 



















A Leadership White Paper 
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment 
Required for Graduation from the  















Greenville Police Department  





The use of Crisis Intervention Units (CIU) during a critical incident is relevant to 
contemporary law enforcement because of the changing world lived in today.  The types 
of issues that are being dealt with all across the United States seem to be growing 
during these harsh economic times.  The diverse cultures and sub-cultures that now call 
the Unites States home can add several more difficulties into what is seemingly an 
“ordinary” situation.  Along with the addition of foreign cultures and languages come the 
inherent dangers of miscommunication.   
The training that was given to police officers in the late 70’s and into the 80’s was 
very restrictive in the use of the Third Party Intermediary (TPI).  There is a growing need 
for police departments to understand that introducing a TPI is no longer taboo; it can 
open up a multitude of opportunities for peaceful resolutions.  Technology has become 
a major factor in the “safe” use of the TPI.  Law enforcement can have TPI’s pre-record 
audio and video scripts and control the introduction of this media to the person in crisis 
or the hostage taker.  Negotiators can conduct research via the internet to better learn 
who or what it is that they are dealing with.  Technology, educational associations, best 
practices, and lessons learned have made crisis intervention and the use of TPI’s a 
more viable resource for law enforcement today.   
All ages across the world are exposed to and partake in negotiations everyday 
for a plethora of reasons.  People are growing more accustomed to the practice of 
negotiations and accepting the word of the unbiased intermediary or arbitrator.  The 
professionals in law enforcement will benefit from the growing familiarity and general 
acceptance of negotiations when it comes time to deploy their specially trained units to 
bring about a peaceful resolution in a critical incident.  Law enforcement agencies 
should use a trained hostage negotiations unit and possibly TPI’s during critical 
incidents. The internet, law enforcement magazines, printed training manuals, case law 
and published books were used to support the position of this paper.  
The recommendation is for Chief’s of Police to ensure that their departments 
have a fully staffed and equipped Crisis Intervention Unit (CIU) that has the latest 
training in crisis intervention and hostage negotiation techniques that can deploy to 
critical incidents.  Furthermore, it is recommended that law enforcement agencies 
support the use of Third Party Intermediaries after carefully calculating the risk and 
benefit as well as Crisis Intervention Training (CIT), which has derived from the ethical 
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INTRODUCTION 
Negotiating in the Untied States is as commonplace as brushing one’s teeth.   
Early settlers had to experience negotiating to survive.  It has become a way of life for 
many across the universe.  Negotiating has been referred to as bartering, horse trading, 
and “scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours” for centuries.  People find themselves 
negotiating for position, money, desires, and needs. The more common reason for 
negotiating is to receive a sense of satisfaction for coming out on top of some sort of 
self serving competition.  
People all across the Universe are growing more and more accustomed to the 
idea of give and take.  Very few people are surprised today when they are contacted by 
the police when they find themselves in crisis.  People who have created a critical 
incident may in fact actually expect or demand the police to contact them.  Many states 
are requiring their first responders and dispatchers to complete crisis intervention 
training.  McMains (2009) stated that negotiators are actually beginning to act as 
consultants to first responders.  This new concept confirms that handling persons in 
crisis is on the rise and that there is a need to have a staff trained in the art of crisis 
intervention.  A large percentage of critical incidents are dealing with the mentally ill and 
suicidal persons and not with hostages.   
While the mentally ill and suicidal pose a threat to themselves, their intent to 
harm others is largely based on public perception of the police response and not the 
actions of the individual in crisis.  It is in the best interest of law enforcement to have a 
standard policy regarding call out guidelines and a clear line of communication between 
the negotiators, tactical, and command staff.  Several factors can affect the desires of 
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the command staff response to limit the footprint they place on a community.  These 
factors can include time of day/night, traffic concerns, geography, staffing, and budget.  
While these are all real concerns and must be taken into account, should the resolution 
be fatal or injurious for anyone involved, the final outcome may be based on the fact 
that the agency did or did not have a hostage negotiations unit and they did or did not 
utilize them in accordance to their policy.  Crises can be triggered by an emotionally 
significant event or radical change of status in a person's life.  While a large number of 
people have the capacity to deal with a crisis or even a multitude of crisis’ in their life, 
law enforcement is consistently coming in contact with the individuals who cannot.  This 
is changing the face of hostage negotiation units (Greenville Police Department, 2001).   
The economy plays a major role in the amount of crisis in a community.  For 
example, if a large employer shuts down, people stand a greater chance of losing things 
in life that they cherish the most.  The loss of one’s home, life’s savings, spousal 
support, and child support are just a few significant emotional events that can trigger a 
crisis.   Some of these crises can be very complicated and difficult to talk about and 
subject matter experts may have to be called in to educate the negotiator(s).  With time 
playing a major role in the outcome of these incidents, it may become necessary for the 
subject matter expert to become a Third Party Intermediary (TPI).    Technology can 
play a vital role in allowing the subject matter expert or TPI to have a significant positive 
impact in the outcome of the crisis.  A video message or an audio recording can be 
scripted, practiced, reviewed, and then sent to the person in crisis.  This allows a 
message to be sent without infringing upon a safety tactic and ensures that the “wrong” 
thing is not being said.  This puts the TPI at ease because most would not be 
 3 
accustomed to dealing with a violent situation and it shelters them from direct contact 
with a situation that may end violently.  TPI’s usually are in one of the following 
categories: family, friends, attorney, clergy, mental health professional and media 
(Lanceley, 2002).  These categories of people, for the most part, are not trained in 
police tactics of negotiating and could possibly have a different set of interests than the 
police. Subject matter experts and TPI’s should be used with calculated caution but 
certainly not ruled out because of their title.  Crisis Intervention Units should be utilized 
during critical incidents, as well as Third Party Intermediaries. 
POSITION 
Crisis intervention has become a basic law enforcement expectation and is a part 
of the assets a contemporary law enforcement agency employs today.  Law 
enforcement agencies have several things to consider when deciding to have a Crisis 
Intervention Unit (CIU).  First and foremost the decision needs to be made in the best 
interest of public safety.  Crisis intervention is a tested and proven method for dealing 
with individuals who are dealing with situations that are beyond their emotional or 
psychological capacity.   
 Law enforcement in Texas began a statewide mandate of Crisis Intervention 
Training (CIT) for officers in 2005.  This type of training has been around for years but 
not mandated for all first responders.  Two white Memphis police officers, in September 
1987, answered a 911 call and ended up shooting and killing a young African-American 
man.  He was cutting himself with a knife and threatening suicide and had a known 
history of mental illness.  The police officers acted in accordance with their training 
when confronted in a deadly force issue.  They demanded that the man drop his 
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weapon. This enraged the young man in crisis and led up to a deadly force 
confrontation.  Vickers (2000) stated, “Although the welfare of both officers and the 
mentally ill in situations of confrontation had been a concern for some time, this death, 
with its racial overtones, was the catalyst that resulted in the creation of CIT a year 
later” (p. 4).  State agencies appear to be overwhelmed with requests for service from 
their end users.  People who suffer from a mental illness have fewer avenues for 
assistance because many of them lack insurance or the means to acquire services.  
Law enforcement’s first responders are responding to more and more calls where 
someone needs to help.  Law enforcement officers continue to encounter numerous 
situations where a mentally ill subject was injured because they (police) did not 
understand their role and obligations in mitigating the call.  First responders are better 
equipped and trained to respond to today’s critical incidents.  
 The second issue to consider when debating to have or not to have a CIU may 
be better clarified when considering Downs v. United States (1975). This case involves 
the forced hi-jacking of a small engine airplane in Nashville, Tennessee on October 4, 
1971.  The plane’s hijackers scheduled a stop at the Jacksonville International Airport to 
refuel and then continued on to Freeport, Bahamas.  Assistant Special Agent James J. 
O’Connor responded and assumed command of the incident.  Two important side notes 
about Special Agent O’Connor is that he was a 21 year veteran of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigations (FBI) and was second in command of Jacksonville’s regional FBI office 
and its 78 agents.  Once the hijacked plane landed and Special Agent O’Connor 
refused to allow the refueling of the plane, the hijacker released two of the planes five 
occupants.  The two occupants were supposedly released to negotiate for fuel.  One of 
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the occupants had vital information about an explosive device on the plane but was 
never really questioned about it or anything in regards to the suspects.  One of the 
released persons ended up being a co-actor and was not questioned; this was in 
accordance with FBI regulations (Downs v. United States, 1975).   
What O’Connor had just done was called negotiation and it was successful.  
O’Connor failed to realize that he had made great strides towards a peaceful resolution.  
O’Conner had also demonstrated that he was aware of FBI regulations by not 
questioning the co-actor but failed to follow FBI regulations in regards to hostage safety 
with his following actions.  O’Connor suddenly assaulted the plane by several attempts 
to shoot out the planes rear tires and the right engine.  O’Connor had also ordered an 
agent to block the forward path of the plane by moving a vehicle in front of the plane.  
Once the gun fire halted, the agents could hear moaning coming from inside the plane.  
The agents discovered that the hostage taker had killed the hostages and fatally 
wounded himself (Downs v. United States, 1975).   
 The Sixth Circuit Court found that Assistant Special Agent O’Connor was 
negligent in handling this situation because he had been trained to handle these types 
of incidents and failed to follow FBI protocol to act reasonably.  The court decision 
states that O’Conner acted unreasonably in turning what had been a successful “waiting 
game,” during which two persons safely left the plane, into a “shooting match” that left 
three persons dead.  Basically, he was aware of hostage negotiation techniques and did 
not utilize the process.  This next case clearly illustrates the need to follow industry 
standards (Downs v. Unites States, 1975).   
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 The use of a TPI has been debated by industry leaders for years.  The latest CIU 
models allow their use but have calculated restrictions concerning who, when, what, 
and how they are used.  One of the more notable case studies in the use of TPI’s is the 
81 day standoff known as the Freeman Siege that took place on a remote ranch in 
Montana in 1996.  During this siege, FBI negotiators allowed as many as 40 TPI’s to 
communicate with the Freemen.  This entire incident allows law enforcement to 
examine the effectiveness of TPI’s. When this outcome is compared to the outcome of 
the 1993 siege of the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas, it validates the 
statement made by FBI Director Louis Freeh “A strategy from Day 1 of patient, honest 
and persistent attempts at negotiation ultimately prevailed,”  (“Patience pays off for FBI 
in Freeman siege,” 1996) . 
 Lessons learned from this encounter lead to the examination of when to use a 
TPI, how the TPI will be used and monitored, who will be used, what the TPI will say 
and how the message will be delivered.  Using a TPI illustrates one crisis negotiation 
technique that proves effective if employed prudently and within an appropriately 
controlled atmosphere (Romano, 1998).  These issues should not be left up to an 
individual but rather the CIU.  There are also tactical considerations that will have to be 
dealt with.  
 When to use a TPI is to be determined by the success of normal negotiations.  If 
law enforcement is successful in the attempt to resolve a crisis peacefully, there is no 
need to introduce a TPI.  When law enforcement is unable to negotiate past a “sticking 
point” and there is no immediate threat, the use of a TPI may need to be evaluated.   
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 How the TPI is utilized is very complex.  The complexity is bordered by safety 
and litigation.  There are numerous considerations in how the TPI will communicate with 
the hostage taker of the person in crisis. Different communication possibilities are face 
to face, telephone, a camera conference, mega phone and pre-recorded messages.  
Once the delivery of the communication is decided, the agency will need to determine 
what is said, the tone that is used and when active listening skills are to be utilized.  The 
tactical considerations will migrate around safety of the TPI.   
 An agency must consider how the hostage taker or the person in crisis will 
respond.  Just like the law enforcement negotiator becoming a second victim in suicide 
intervention and hostage recovery attempts, the TPI can likely become a second victim 
if a peaceful resolution is not the outcome.  The TPI will have to be monitored and 
accept the fact that communications with a subject may be terminated without notice.   
 The oath to preserve life and liberty, value of life, value of intelligence, public 
perception and trust are just a few considerations of a contemporary law enforcement 
agency.  Without the attempt to gather intelligence and bring about a peaceful resolution 
before an assault, can lead to years of litigation wrapped around the loss of life.  This 
will lead to negative public perception, loss of public trust and will be a huge debt on the 
tax payers.  It has been said that, “the crisis intervention process is more successful if 
we wait and talk rather than delay and assault” (Strentz, 2005, p. 27).  Law 
enforcement, like any authority, is judged by its actions and not its intent.  In these crisis 





There are a couple of reasons a person may say that law enforcement agencies 
should not and will not have a CIU and additionally, TPI’s will not be utilized.  This paper 
will address the two major reasons a law enforcement agency may not get political 
support to engage in Crisis Intervention or utilize third party intermediaries.  The most 
obvious reason is the impact to the budget.  The law enforcement agency will have to 
consider training cost, equipment cost and overtime expenses when the unit is 
activated.  Most teams are comprised of four officers, a primary, a secondary, an 
information officer and a tactical and command liaison.  Each officer will need to attend 
a 40 hour basic hostage negotiation school.  These schools are affordable if the officer 
becomes a member of a discipline related professional association that is sponsoring 
the school.  However, the membership is an additional expense.  Most agencies will pay 
for the officer’s travel, per diem, and hotel expenses.  While the officers are at training, 
the vacancies that were created will have to be backfilled which can create an overtime 
expense.  The training that is suggested for each officer is 40 hours per year so that 
each negotiator can legally manipulate phone lines during critical incidents.  This 
amount of training can easily add up to thousands of dollars per year. 
 Once the training is completed there are a number of different throw phone 
systems that can be purchased.  The throw phones are the devices that are the most 
desired mode of communication with a person in crisis or the hostage taker.  The phone 
systems can be very expensive depending on the options that the agency desires.  
Many available options are designed to make the incident safer by the intelligence that 
is gathered through them.  There are obviously less expensive throw phone systems 
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that are available but the agency should estimate a cost of $5,000 to $25,000.  The 
equipment can be quite bulky and may require a specially designed trailer or a sport 
utility vehicle for transportation to the incident site.  The cost involved is up to the 
agency and can range from $5,000 to $750,000.  In addition, while new negotiators are 
in training, the agency may be understaffed in key positions.  The vacancies must be 
backfilled to meet minimum staffing levels and this creates additional costs (Greenville 
Police Department, 2001).   
 The cost involved in the implementation of a CIU could easily influence a law 
enforcement agency or city administration from considering its creation. The following 
suggestions are included to help mitigate the overall cost.  First, the training could 
actually be sponsored at the local law enforcement agency.  Many times this allows for 
the sponsoring agency to attend for free.  Agencies could also rotate the training so that 
manpower issues would be much easier to coordinate with lower overtime cost.  The 
agency can start out with the more basic model throw phone and add options when the 
jurisdiction can afford to do so.  Even the most basic throw phone meets industry 
standards. Most agencies can utilize its existing fleet to initiate a new program.  More 
technological advanced phone options and more specialized vehicles can be added as 
budget allows.  There are numerous grants available that can assist in acquiring 
specialty vehicles and equipment that can make the funding process easier for an 
agency. 
 Another major issue for law enforcement is the self imposed time table.  Many 
law enforcement officials place a time limit for peaceful resolution to critical incidents.  
Once this time limit has expired a forceful tactical resolution is ordered.  While there are 
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segments of society that introduce arguments for expediency, law enforcement cannot 
afford to succumb to such issues.  Critical incidents or hostage situations can create 
major delays in the lives of the detached.  These individuals can create political 
influence to expedite the incident to a conclusion.  Some of the delays can include 
extended road closures, business closures, service delays and air traffic restrictions.  
These issues can cost businesses and the public time and money.  Mass transit can be 
delayed and services such as phone and food delivery can be impacted.   
 Delegating sensitive duties to subordinates, much less a TPI is not always 
practiced in law enforcement.  During a critical incident when the lives of one or more 
hang in the balance of time, proper articulation, training, experience, willingness to 
accept the responsibility and pressure of political inconvenience, volunteering civilians 
have historically not been utilized.  There are two major influences in this decision, 
potential loss of life and the liability of an untrained civilian saying or doing the wrong 
thing(s).  No Chief or administrator wants to be responsible for utilizing an untrained TPI 
and, as a result, have to explain why the incident had a negative outcome.  
           These issues can be mitigated with proper protocol(s), training and 
Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) with local agencies for mutual aid.  Protocols 
should include multiple disciplines in your jurisdictions such as public works, street 
department, phone company, electric company, and the media.  Training should be 
providede for the agency command staff and certain city officials as well as citizens 
through a Citizen Police Academy.  The MOU’s for mutual aid will include law 
enforcement, fire protection and emergency medical services.  Part of the consideration 
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for mutual aid is the redundancy of services and the continued support of basic core 
public safety and city services.  
CONCLUSION 
           In conclusion, there seems to be a growing number of people who are finding 
themselves consuming law enforcement services while in a state of crisis.  Law 
enforcement has realized this trend as well as the potential for a growing number of 
deadly force encounters.  In Texas and all across the United States, first responders are 
being trained in crisis intervention techniques.  These techniques are designed to give 
officers alternative resolution guidelines thus reducing injuries to officers and 
consumers.  Crisis Intervention Units are becoming an industry standard in 
contemporary law enforcement agencies.  The ability to forego an attempt for peaceful 
resolution in critical incidents is no longer acceptable and leads to litigation and in some 
instances the loss of life.  The practice of using a TPI is no longer taboo to the modern 
CIU.  The two major factors that are in direct opposition to negotiations are dwindling 
local government budgets and pressures of a more modern and efficient lifestyle.  The 
budget concerns can easily become non-issues when law enforcement personnel start 
thinking outside of the box.  Most officers are more than willing to adjust their schedules 
and accept lateral duties when it comes to protecting their constituents and their 
citizens.  When considering the political pressures placed on city administrators and 
leaders due to potential delays, one has to consider the value of life.  The delays 
someone might encounter are easy to disqualify when considering the potential loss of 
life during critical incidents if agencies decide to forego the negotiation or intervention 
process.  Lessons learned and best practices are a huge part of the success of law 
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enforcement.  Law enforcement agencies need to closely examine how they handle 
incidents with consumers who have no expectation or understanding of the services 
available to them.  It is easy for agencies to perform a minimum level of service and 
push the consumer over to their own destiny.  The next possible step in Crisis 
Intervention is the development of programmatic follow up to ensure consumer 
assistance after crisis.  Obviously, this brings up the need for additional research as well 
as launching a level of service that is far reaching into multiple levels of social services.  
The recommendation based on this research is that the use of a CIU and/or TPI during 
critical incidents should be an industry standard by all law enforcement agencies 
regardless of budget or political pressures. 
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